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　1.　Introduction
This paper will use the photographic image, 
Reflections in the Carousel of Desire, as an entry point 
to the discussion of some of Jacques Lacan’s basic 
forms and roles of desire in a subjective economy. 
Mark Bracher, in Lacan, Discourse, and Social 
Change, suggests interpellation, in its philosophical 
usage—as the process by which cultural beliefs are 
simply “assumed” rather than questioned—sparks 
the fires of desire to perform this role. He contends 
we must understand the various roles of desire to 
“intervene in the interpellative forces of culture 
[in order] to have a positive influence on social 
change” (19). The Carousel of Desire photograph 
is neither a constructed nor a created image; that 
is, it was not physically orchestrated in terms 
of the placement of the foci, nor was it digitally 
altered. Rather, it was faithfully recorded through 
a lens aperture equivalent to the way a human eye 
would see the subject. From the perspective of the 
interplay of gender, identity, and social efficacy of 
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the constructed self, this presentation will explore 
how the image creates us.
Bracher notes, “The fact that one originally 
attains one’s own desire only by means of the 
bodily images of another person means that like 
the Imaginary identification of the mirror stage, 
Imaginary-order desire is from the beginning a 
social and even fictional phenomenon [and that] 
this fictional, metaphoric nature of desire means 
that there is no intrinsic, essential, or absolute 
content to desire in the Imaginary order any more 
than in the Symbolic order and that desire in the 
Imaginary order is produced through the operation 
of images in cultural artifacts” (34). 
Analysis of Reflections in the Carousel of Desire 
from a Lacanian perspective will explore how the 
images in this photograph, as signifiers qua cultural 
artifacts, seek to create the self.
　2.　Images Watch Us
2.1　 The World through the Viewfinder as a 
Species of the Real: Background on the 
context of the photograph
The purpose of using a photograph and analysis 
of specific elements it contains to discuss particular 
moments in the economy of desire from a Lacanian 
perspective—with commentary from other scholars 
of gender, identity, and Lacan—is to offer a plausible 
interpretation that invites diverse impressions 
rather than claims to provide absolute definitions.
In using aspects of the Carousel of Desire 
photograph to consider features of Lacan’s 
philosophy, concise consideration of the mechanics 
of the image will be useful. First, relevant technical 
data will be summarized with explanation as to 
why this information is pertinent. Of course, the 
prequel question to be answered is why one would 
use a photograph at all; why not use a text extract 
or a work of art? My principle reason is connected 
to the argument that the documentary nature of 
photographs and their power to create new realities, 
whether intended or not, may and should make us 
question their veracity as compared to correctly 
referenced academic writing or famous art works 
that have a body of scholarly critique that may be 
researched and cited.
Photographic images are ubiquitous and ambiguous. 
They are par t of our ever yday lives. They are 
also dialogic entities. On one hand, we regard 
photographic images as mundane. Like surveillance 
cameras, they simply record their context without 
analysis or interpretation. On the other hand, this 
function gives photographic images an authenticity 
that commentators, notably Susan Sontag and John 
Berger, have discussed as tracings off of the real. 
Sontag comments that a photograph, unlike 
a painting, has the power of a tracing of the real 
because it had contact with reality in the way a 
death mask has physical contact with the contours 
of the face with which it is impressed. Sontag, in 
On Photography, comments on the photograph’s 
distinctiveness and its relationship with questions 
of identity. “No one takes an easel painting to be 
in any sense co-substantial with its subject; it only 
represents or refers. But a photograph is not only 
like its subject, a [sic] homage to the subject. It is 
part of, an extension of that subject; and a potent 
means of acquiring it, of gaining control over it” 
(Sontag, 155). 
This description speaks to the power of the 
photograph. Sontag also identifies the primacy of 
the photography. She notes, “the images that have 
virtually unlimited authority in a modern society 
are mainly photographic images; and the scope of 
that authority stems from the properties peculiar 
to images taken by cameras” (Sontag, 151). Sontag 
uses the term “trace” in explaining the photograph 
goes beyond a painting, stressing that, “Such 
images are indeed able to usurp reality because 
first of all a photograph is not only an image (as a 
painting is an image), an interpretation of the real; it 
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is also a trace, something directly stenciled off the 
real, like a footprint or a death mask” (Sontag, 154). 
It’s significant that the tracing “of f the real” 
performed by photography accomplishes a function 
beyond documentation. It creates a new reality. 
“Photographs do more than redefine the stuf f 
of ordinary experience (people, things, events, 
[…] Reality as such is redefined—as an item for 
exhibition, as a record for scrutiny, as a target for 
surveillance. […] providing possibilities of control 
that could not even be dreamed of under the earlier 
system of recording information: writing” (Sontag, 
156). 
While grounded in “the real” the concept of 
“the tr ue” in photography requires a deeper 
interrogation of how realities—even those like 
the footprints or death masks Sontag speaks 
of—are presented. John Berger engages in this 
investigation. “Photographs, it is said, tell the truth. 
From this simplification, which reduces the truth to 
the instantaneous, it follows that what a photograph 
tells about a door or a volcano belongs to the same 
order of truth as what it tells about a man weeping 
or a woman’s body. If no theoretical distinction 
has been made between the photograph as 
scientific evidence and the photograph as a means 
of communication, this has been not so much an 
oversight as a proposal. The proposal was (and is) 
that when something is visible, it is a fact, and that 
facts contain the only truth” (Berger and Mohr, 
Another Way of Telling, Loc. 553-558).
Of course, the altering of photographic images 
is as old and common as photography itself, 
but as Berger notes, this is evidence of the 
perceived authenticity of the photographic image 
and the power of faked photographs to deceive 
derives precisely from the common belief that 
photographs tell the truth. Berger would say 
photographs always tell a truth rather than the 
truth and also contends that in the case of faked 
photographs there is really something dif ferent 
from photography going on. In Another Way of 
Telling, Berger discusses how “photographs can be, 
and are, massively used to deceive and misinform” 
and comments parenthetically, “(…You can only 
make a photograph tell an explicit lie by elaborate 
tampering, collage, and re-photographing. You 
have in fact ceased to practise [sic] photography. 
Photography in itself has no language which can 
be turned.)” (Berger, Loc. 492-94). He notes, “The 
camera does not lie even when it is used to quote a 
lie. And so, this makes the lie appear more truthful” 
(Berger, Loc. 500-501).
This is why the commonplace authenticity of 
my Carousel of Desire photograph is relevant. In 
contextualizing this photograph it is necessar y 
to briefly touch on the technical details of this 
image. While it was not digitally altered, it was 
digitally recorded and this electronic trace also 
archives its own history in a file referred to as 
Exchangeable Image File Format (EXIF) metadata. 
This is its claim at authenticity—like a DNA tag—
that is increasingly being required as a verification 
security protocol major news agencies demand 
for responsible publication of freelance-sourced 
images. If digital electronic photography rather 
than chemical-based photography is, in itself, an 
alteration that somehow “fakes” the results or 
if using electronic imaging somehow creates an 
unreal result, this leads to an interesting discussion 
on the limits of reality from a technology of imaging 
perspective that would be the subject of a different 
paper. 
In the context of An Analysis of Reflections in the 
Carousel of Desire from a Lacanian Perspective, 
what is most relevant is that Carousel of Desire is 
an accurate recording of the scene. The EXIF lists 
detailed authenticating data, but for the purposes of 
this paper only two items are most pertinent. The 
first is “Focal Length In 35mm Film: 46” and this is 
relevant because the human eye is basically a 50mm 
lens, so a focal length of 46 means that’s what the 
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average human would see if they were standing 
beside the photographer. 
The camera only recorded the appearance of 
reality; there were no double exposures or post-
production tricks. The shot was taken into a window 
to show both view and reflection and that’s the file 
straight out of the camera. The EXIF makes the 
simple statement, “A directly photographed image.”
2.2　A Brief Description of the Whole
First, the entire image may be regarded. The 
central element is the carousel. It is the most 
brightly lit, active, and attractive par t of the 
photograph and the namesake motif around which 
all the other elements are organized. Under the 
carousel is an expanse of blue the carousel seems 
to float above. It is the blue of sky on a cloudless 
afternoon, but is actually water and the carousel 
is mounted on a concrete pad that sits atop piers a 
water-rollercoaster travels around beneath. Above 
the seating area on the carousel is the longitudinally 
patterned tent-like canopy, with alternating sections 
of blue and white that ascend toward the largest 
humanoid detail in the photograph—a mannequin—
and the interior of a women’s clothing shop. On the 
right side of the image we see the trees and foliage 
of the park where the carousel operates and to the 
left are benches and the paved park grounds.
We may now “read” the discourse and rhetoric of 
this artifact on a feature-by-feature basis.
　3.　Master Signifiers:
3.1 The Goddess of Desire as a Sign of Woman
The passive anaclitic form of Imaginary desire is 
exemplified in “the phenomenon of fashion, which 
offers corporeal images that subjects can conform 
with in order to satisfy their desire to be attractive 
to others—that is, desired as objects of jouissance 
by others” (Mark Bracher, Lacan, Discourse, and 
Social Change, 40). The nucleating point that 
sparks here is that photographs may be (and that 
Carousel of Desire showcases) cultural ar tifacts 
that present controlling rhetoric, a rhetoric that 
cajoles and controls, that images define us, and that 
photographs are control mechanisms.               
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3.2　 The Consumer of Goods as a Product of 
the Economy of Desire
In the top center third of the Carousel of Desire, 
manifested above the carousel like Venus emerging 
from and a caryatid supporting the structure of 
desire to be attractive to others, is the female form 
idealized as a mannequin. Its height matches the 
carousel’s and the action in the complete image 
radiates out from the figure of the idealized woman 
and the diminutive figure of the living woman who is 
holding a dress exactly like the one the mannequin 
is modeling. Bluish longitudinal bands of light—
reflections of the canopy of the carousel below—
visually draw the woman and mannequin together. 
The woman is, however, in an inferior position to 
the mannequin; smaller in size and almost entirely 
contained by the reflected bands of blue light. The 
mannequin, through the positioning of its hands, 
seems to be directing the light to envelop the 
woman.
In his discussion of interpellation through Master 
Signifiers, Bracher delineates Lacan’s “registers 
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of subjectivity”—Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real. 
He specifies that, “In culture, these three registers 
manifest themselves respectively, in signifiers, 
images and fantasies. Of the three, it is the signifier 
that holds the key to desire. As Lacan puts it, ‘It 
is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the 
channel of desire flows’ (Ecrits: A Selection 259)” 
(Bracher 23). 
Bracher notes “passive narcissistic desires of 
the Symbolic order” involve a feeling that “subjects 
are loved by the Symbolic Other because of the 
signifier they embody, as indicated, for example, in 
the belief that God loves ‘the meek,’ in the notion 
that Nature loves ‘the wise and pure’ (Coleridge, 
‘Dejection’), and in the conviction that Society loves 
‘a winner’” (23). Signifiers one embodies, with “such 
identity-bearing words”, are what Lacan calls master 
signifiers (23). In the above detail from Carousel of 
Desire we see the woman reaching for the clothing 
modeled by a symbolic other in the form of the 
idealization of the cultural notion of female. The 
woman in the photograph gazes from the dress 
in her hands toward the model representing the 
Symbolic Other. Of course, the woman is not 
consciously seeking the approval and love of the 
mannequin as a totem representing the Symbolic 
Other (“passive narcissistic desire … to be the 
object of the Other’s love”). Yet, the woman regards 
both the mannequin and the dress it wears with an 
eye toward emulation (“active narcissistic desire”) 
if not adoration. “Subjects strive to fully actualize 
the qualities they have identified with, while their 
role as the effect of desire can be seen from the 
fact that identifications are always motivated—that 
is, they respond to a want-of-being” (Bracher 22). 
The woman is caught in a net, entangled in a web. 
The effect of this interplay of master and secondary 
signif iers –ones “bearing a metonymic and 
metaphoric relation to the operative signifier” (27)—
that, by associating with and giving interpretive 
meaning to the master signifiers, leads to “active 
narcissistic desire” in which one desires to 
become the Other. “That is, we gravitate (in active 
narcissistic desire) toward positions and identify 
with persons, characters and images linked with 
one or more of the master signifiers constituting 
our ego ideal” (27).
Seeing this perspective also invites engagement 
with the underlying narrative. In what I would 
consider a rejection of the sexist master signifiers 
and minor ones that importantly support the master 
signifiers, bell hooks correctly advises repudiation 
of debilitating associations. “Feminist ideology 
should not encourage (as sexism has done) women 
to believe they are powerless. It should clarify for 
women the powers they exercise daily and show 
them ways these powers can be used to resist sexist 
domination and exploitation” (hooks 95). Definitions 
of identity are not fixed; they are ar tificially 
imposed and then fixated on the maintenance of 
a particular style of privilege and domination. In 
the instant case of women as consumers, hooks 
comments that “profit from the sale of women’s 
fashion alone makes it one of the major industries 
in this economy. Endless purchases of small items 
can lead to enormous economic profit and power. 
As consumers, women have power, and if organized 
could use that power to improve women’s social 
status” (hooks 95).
3.3　 Signs and Signifiers of Unattainable 
Desires within Grim Truths
On the distinction between signs and signifiers, 
Lacan says, “the domain of sexuality shows a 
natural functioning of signs […] and, according 
to the definition of the sign, something intended 
for someone. The signifier, being something 
quite dif ferent, represents a subject for another 
signifier” (Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis, 157).
In the upper left portion of the photograph are 
the most basic of signs in the form of actual paint-
118
大妻女子大学紀要
―社会情報系― 社会情報学研究  25  2016
on-wood signage. The rhetoric of these signs, in the 
economy of desire, may be unpacked. For clarity, 
the reflected image has been mirrored to allow 
us to read the English words. Since this shop is in 
Tokyo, these words would function as symbols of 
Western fashion and design. While various totem 
words have been “Japanized” because English is 
considered to be sophisticated and stylish, others 
retain their original meaning. Lacan states we are 
products of language and culture. In the above 
detail, both of these master signifiers (language and 
culture) may be considered. 
Language from a meaning-making perspective—a 
semiotic role—performs a rhetorical function in the 
graphic 
 LIFE is short. So make your life be full of 
Happiness
that occupies the eye-level to shoulder space of 
the mannequin on the right. The way to be full 
of happiness is to fulfill your desires that, in this 
case, must be to buy the items on display in this 
shop. The grim reminder of one’s mor tality is 
the rhetorical device used to persuade potential 
purchasers to spend one signifier, money, to attain 
happiness. In this exchange, happiness is also a 
secondary signifier for an ideal desired condition. 
From a Japanese cultural perspective, the 
common use of words denoting qualities like 
happiness, kindness, safety, or calmness is to 
ascribe the idealized condition rather than the 
transient state. For example, a compliment would 
take the form “you are kindness person” rather 
than “you are kind.” Lacan notes that the perfect 
condition of eternal kindness or happiness is a 
desire that will never be fulfilled. We don’t get what 
we say we want. We never get what we say we 
want. What we get is the want of wanting—desire. 
Lacan describes this as “a residue” that is the 
result of alienated needs that can’t be articulated 
by one’s demands (Lacan, Feminine Sexuality, 80). 
Further, Lacan takes issue with the current state 
of psychoanalysis that conflates the “reduction of 
desire to need” (80) when these two concepts must 
be regarded in opposition. Demand, in Lacan’s 
usage, is not related to what is granted or withheld. 
Rather, it is for the existence of an Other with the 
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power to grant or withhold. “Demand constitutes 
this Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of 
satisfying needs, that is, the power to deprive them 
of the one thing by which they are satisfied” (80).
Culturally, the graphic in capital letters with the 
second “love” in bold typeface in “LOVELOVE” 
is a Japanized English phrase used to refer to 
couples in a physically romantic relationship. 
The phrase “they are not just friends, they are 
‘lovelove’ together” conveys this jouissance. Most 
particularly, the power of what is hidden and in 
fact unattainable is demonstrated in the act of 
lovemaking. Each partner must appear to have what 
the other wants. Here it’s important to maintain 
the distinction between want and desire. In the 
example Lacan gives of a heterosexual couple, “an 
‘appearing’ which gets substituted for the ‘having’ 
[intervenes] so as to protect it on one side and 
to mask its lack on the other” (84). The power 
dynamic in play, which we may refer to as the 
heterosexually-normative economy, is of the male 
wanting to present himself as if his phallus is rather 
than signifies the Other and the female wanting 
to present herself as if her agreement to envelop 
his phallus will satisfy her desire for the Other. As 
Lacan states, “It is for what she is not that that she 
expects to be desired as well as loved. But she finds 
the signifier of her own desire in the body of the 
one to whom she addresses her demand for love” 
(84).
Other words, like DREAM and COOL, along 
with two that are hidden behind the mannequin—
“sweet” (we see the “S” just behind the mannequin’s 
elbow) and “delicious”—evoke strongly positive 
associations. The English words, well known as 
iconic shapes and culturally meaningful phrases 
in modern-day Japan, are secondar y signifiers 
that ar ticulate desires and suppor t the master 
signifier “woman” with attributes to be cultivated, 
like “sweet” and “lovelove.” Throughout the shop 
these words are repeated in other signs that act as 
decorations and display the positive signifiers one is 
urged to embody.
Since our “identity is determined to a large 
degree by what happens to those signifiers that 
represent us—our master signifiers—particularly 
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the alliances they form with and the wars they wage 
on other signifiers” (Bracher 25), we want them 
repeated often (26) and “Since the Symbolic Other 
extends beyond individual authority figures and 
is ultimately coextensive with the Symbolic order 
itself, the signifiers one desires to embody in order 
to achieve recognition by the Other are, in the final 
analysis, those signifiers given pride of place by a 
system of language as such” (27).
Returning the detail of signage to its reflected 
orientation in the actual photograph, we see a small 
human form in the lower left corner (look all the 
way down the centerline of the hatless mannequin).
The detail of this section, looking further down 
and through the window reveals three humans—
two standing and one seated—in the lower left.
3.4　Three Humans in the Lower Left
In this detail we see a woman A seated on a 
bench on the left center part. She is gazing into 
her mobile telephone, a tiny machine. The man 
B above and to the right of the woman is walking 
away from the carousel, which is the largest 
machine in Carousel of Desire. The man C we could 
see in the signage detail above is interacting with 
a human-sized machine. It seems to be a vending 
machine. These are peripheral isolated individuals 
in the photograph, yet they spark one reverie—the 
notion of machine reality as a control mechanism 
that mediates the economy of desire. While space 
does not permit a more complete exploration of 
this theme, one extract from Donna Haraway’s 
Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and socialist-
feminism in the late twentieth century will be 
adduced to support the case that our relationship to 
technology as a signifier of modernity (as machine 
reality) is a control mechanism that mediates the 
economy of desire.  Haraway obser ves, “…the 
?
?
?
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boundary between science fiction and social reality 
is an optical illusion [and that] intense pleasure 
in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an 
aspect of embodiment. The machine is not an it 
to be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The 
machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our 
embodiment” (Haraway, 315).
We then move to the right side of the photograph.
3.5　 On the Verge of the Natural World: Foliage 
at the Lower Right
The deep green foliage beside the staircase 
leading up to the carousel in the lower right 
may plausibly be interpreted as the realm of the 
unconscious. It is a fractal image—the most difficult 
to appreciate visually because it organizes itself with 
an organic logic that is resistant to interpretation 
by electronic and mechanical (digital camera) 
means—that marks the entrance to the carousel. 
It is a vestige of nature; untamed, romantic, poetic, 
and passionate. Looking again at the full image of 
Carousel of Desire, we see this deep green foliage 
frames the entire right side of the image and 
accounts for twenty percent of the visual surface. 
It verges and yet is distinct from the built world 
of the rest of the photograph. At this point I will 
imagine the natural green area as female and the 
structured built area as male, with the male area 
showing “femaleness” as a set of structures women 
are urged to conform to.   
Luce Irigaray, in “The Question of the Other”, 
asserts there must be an “otherness” for women 
outside the ambit of equality with men because 
“the lack of special rights for women does not 
allow them [women] to move from a state of nature 
to a civilized state” (Irigarary, 14) and Irigarary 
presents this case noting concrete examples such 
as how exploitation of women must be resolved 
by efforts “resolved within difference rather than 
by abolishing it” (10), with discussion of long-
held male-based biases of Western philosophy 
(12), and with romantic, poetic passion (17). This 
intentionally echoes the above distinction between 
the deep green foliage verge as the untamed, 
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romantic, and passionate feminine portion of the 
Carousel of Desire photograph in contrast to the 
mechanical built world of the eighty percent that 
may be conceptualized as the masculine (which 
includes the masculine impression of the feminine) 
portion of the image. 
If we don’t travel far enough down into the 
landscape of Irigaray’s schema, we may not 
appreciate that the “intellectual scener y” that 
contains such wonders as a new feminine language 
that would allow women to express themselves if 
it could be spoken corresponds to dialect being 
spoken (philosophically speaking) by Jacques 
Lacan. We would find Irigarar y’s new feminine 
language strikingly similar to the third stage in 
Lacan’s philosophy of three orders—Symbolic, 
Imaginary, Real—the last of which has very specific 
counterintuitive and non-common-sense meaning in 
Lacan’s universe. For Lacan, the Real is that which 
is outside language and that resists symbolization 
absolutely.
We come to a wall. This wall directs us up the 
staircase. The staircase channels and regulates 
the flow of our steps—provides a structure for our 
movement—up toward the carousel.               
3.6　The central image of the carousel
Mirrors are mounted around the carousel’s 
core. I will reference these mirrors a number of 
times. First, the mirrors allow riders to recognize 
themselves on their favorite animal mannequin 
(and for mommy or daddy to say “that’s you on the 
horsey!” to their delighted offspring). Bracher notes 
the urge to have an identity in which one recognizes 
oneself and is recognized by others results in “the 
establishment of a cluster of master signifiers as the 
ego ideal, which originates in the child’s attempt to 
be desired and loved—that is, recognized (passive 
narcissistic desire)—by the Other” (24). For the 
child it is the parent who represents the Other. 
Bracher continues that master signifiers provide 
feelings of coherence and continuity essential to 
identity and “are, as Lacan puts it, what makes a 
discourse readable (XVII 218)” (24). The discourse 
of the carousel, with animals represented as toys 
to be safely ridden for enjoyment, communicates a 
sense of coherence and continuity. On a carousel 
the rider moves and the surrounding world remains 
the same. As a trigger to Hélène Cixous’ thoughts 
in Laugh of the Medusa, we see Medusa heads as 
decorations between oval mirrors on the carousel’s 
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frieze. On the inner wall of the carousel there are 
only mirrors. On the subject of constantly changing 
appearances that challenge notions of coherence 
and continuity, Cixous says, “One can no more 
speak of ‘woman’ than of ‘man’ (207) without being 
trapped within an ideological theater where the 
proliferation of representations, images, reflections, 
myths, identifications, transform, deform, constantly 
change ever yone’s Imaginar y and invalidate in 
advance any conceptualization” (208). 
Cixous’ mention of Lacan’s Imaginary, as the 
register of subjectivity in which images invoke 
desire, further supports the need to break out of the 
‘ideological theater’ and also leads to her concluding 
that “nothing compels us to deposit our lives in 
these lack-banks; to think the subject is constituted 
as the last stage in a drama of bruising rehearsals; 
to endlessly bail out the father’s religion” (210). The 
term “lack-banks” evokes associations with Lacan’s 
third register of subjectivity, the Real. What is Real 
is the lack stored in these banks. Considering the 
double tier of mirrors on the carousel—one girding 
the inner barrel and another between Medusa 
heads on the upper frieze—as an attempt to reflect 
the real world around, the metaphor of the mirror 
may do double ser vice for references to both 
Cixous and Lacan. 
For Cixous, like her metaphor of white ink writing 
on white paper, the absence that marks the Real 
inscribes it as an absence by providing a ground on 
which the figure of its absence can be expected and 
the condition of its never arriving is confirmed. That 
is, the images in the mirror mirror reality and are 
not real “through the looking glass” locations we 
may ever visit. Lacan couches this in reference to 
the act of making a photograph and plays with the 
idea of a photograph (or its precursor, a camera) 
being better understood as a mirror.
In “Sexuality in the Defiles of the Signifier” Lacan 
speaks of the way in which “the nodal point by 
which the pulsation of the unconscious is linked to 
sexual reality must be revealed. This nodal point 
is called desire” (Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 154). Desire always has 
a hidden component. Lacan describes the “topology 
of the subject (of cer tainty/uncer tainty in the 
network of signifiers in relation to sexuality and 
sexual identity) according to a sign that I [Lacan] 
once called the interior 8” (155). Lacan continues, 
“you have only to turn the obturator [basically, 
opening] I referred to earlier [the enclosed circle of 
the 8 when viewed three-dimensionally from above, 
in which sexuality always contains the inner core of 
desire] into a camera shutter, except that it would 
be a mirror. It is in this little mirror, which shuts 
out what is on the other side, that the subject sees 
emerge the game by means of which he may—
according to the illusion of what is obtained in the 
experiment of the inverted bunch of flowers, that 
is to say, a real image — accommodate his own 
image around what appears, the petit a” (159). Here 
I would understand the small “other” as one’s ego 
projection; in other words, as one’s sexual identity 
as constituted by a desire that is closed off from 
itself.
In setting out to “distinguish between the Real 
as the organic substrate of subjectivity constituted 
by our body, where drives are grounded, and the 
Real as the (psycho)logical effect of the subject’s 
accession to the Symbolic order, the irreducible 
lack that is the heart of subjectivity and to which 
fantasy responds” (40), Bracher quotes Slavoj Zizek. 
Zizek writes that while the kernel of the Real may 
be jouissance as enjoyment, there is also the nuance 
of too much enjoyment, as in what is left over when 
one has experienced a surplus of enjoyment and 
is beset with lassitude, which Zizek describes as 
a void whereby “the Real is in itself a hole, a gap, 
an opening in the middle of the symbolic order—
it is the lack around which the symbolic order is 
structured. (169-70)” (41). Consideration of this 
lack following surplus invites the question of what 
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residual impression Carousel of Desire leaves us 
with.
3.7　 The Entire Image as an Entity that Defines 
Us 
Begging the question in this section’s heading, 
the entire image is an entity that defines us because 
it reflects a world that identifies us as we identify 
ourselves in it. Those last eight words—identifies 
us as we identify ourselves in it—is how Lacan’s 
camera-as-mirror metaphor operates and reprises 
the idea of a photograph (or its precursor, a camera) 
being better understood as a mirroring device in 
a Lacanian sense that photographs are signifying 
images.
Returning to the “teaser copy” that precedes the 
title to this paper, Images Watch Us, we may also add 
that images speak to us and photographs seek to 
define us. We are what the photograph says and it 
says, “do this” and “be this” and “want this” and “buy 
this” and you may be able to “be that,” so “do this” 
in an endless circle, in a carousel of desire in which 
wanting is the coinage in the economy and goods 
are the tokens in the game and the understanding 
is (to quote a popular Japanese marketing slogan) 
that nothing is better than the “next next.” It’s an 
economy in which I paraphrase Lao Tsu in saying 
that wanting is the symptom and having is the 
disease.* It’s a situation in which feeling you can 
have anything you want makes you want everything; 
in which having everything makes you disappointed 
in everything. Or, put another way, that when you 
can have (or have) everything you are satisfied with 
nothing. You have everything except satisfaction. 
Desire keeps the carousel turning, but seeing we 
are on the carousel is the first task to finding a way 
off of it. Indeed, the phrase “did you get off?” has 
come to be synonymous with one partner seeking 
confirmation of another’s attainment of the fleeting 
ecstasy of jouissance.
　4.　Conclusion
As outlined at the start, the goal of this paper was 
not to explain the entirety of Lacan’s philosophy, 
system, and his reformulation of Freud in terms 
of gender and identity as artificial emanations of 
language and culture. That project would require 
study many years in duration that might only be 
summarized in delineating the contours of Lacan’s 
registers of Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real with 
insights from scholars who have spent careers—
collectively, centuries—offering their trenchant 
interpretations. 
Rather, this Analysis of Reflections in the Carousel 
of Desire from a Lacanian Perspective aimed to 
of fer plausible entry points into the functioning 
of the economy of desire by examining one 
photograph and referencing selected concepts from 
Lacan and other writers who have provided cogent 
interpretation of his work.
As Bracher concludes “The value of  this 
taxonomy of desire … lies not in its capacity to 
serve as a totalizing system … [but] … rather in 
its demonstration of the multifariousness of and 
complexity of desire and in its function as a kind 
of checklist prompting us to search a given text or 
discourse for interpellative forces that might not be 
immediately evident” (52) and he asserts that the 
identification of these forces “is a primary means 
for promoting social change” (52).
This paper, in examining one image from the 
real world from a Lacanian perspective, presents 
Reflections in the Carousel of Desire as a synecdoche 
and suggests that al l  photographs must be 
interrogated rather than internalized. As they seek 
to define us, we must dialogically undertake to 
deconstruct and analyze them. Interpellation, in 
its philosophical usage—as the process by which 
cultural beliefs are simply assumed rather than 
questioned—must be interpenetrated and Dr. Lacan 
has provided us with the instruments to perform 
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this operation. This paper has attempted to give us 
some experience in using them.
---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This paper was written in the main by Lawrence 
Karn, with the very kind assistance and support of 
Takahiko Hattori.
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